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ABSTRACT 
The rapid adaptation to mobile devices and data sharing has changed our life style 
significantly. Despite the fact that this provides great comfort and proficiency, it also imposes 
greater challenges in ensuring a secure transfer of sensitive information through these devices. 
This information could be highly confidential that the owner wants to provide access privileges 
only to authorized individuals. Many cryptographic algorithms together with potent data protection 
mechanisms available today are robust enough to ensure the Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability of information. One significant use-case in this regard is when the data owner wants 
to only share the data securely with the authorized user just once, and making it extremely difficult 
for user to store or make a copy of the data or to share it with others. In this scenario, it is practically 
impossible for the data owner to be available and spy on the user all the time to ensure these 
security requirements are met.  
In order to address this concern, this thesis work tried to provide a secure mechanism to 
share information that would authorize end users to access data only once and endeavors to prevent 
the user from duplicating the data and sharing it with unauthorized users. A part of this work 
proposes a variant of Proxy Re-encryption algorithm, a relatively new cryptographic primitive, 
which offers the data owner a way to securely share his/her data via a proxy server, without the 
need to be available all the time. The proxy server takes care of data re-encryption and data 
distribution to the registered users, without letting any unauthorized user to decrypt the information 
and also the proxy itself cannot decrypt the information. With this scheme, the proxy encrypts an 
already encrypted information in such a way that another secret key can decrypt it. The re-
encryption key is unique for each registered user and is generated by the data owner by combining 
the registered user’s public key and his/her own private key. Here, the novelty of this thesis and 
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the most challenging part is to allow only one-time access to data and to attempt to prevent the 
user from storing the decrypted data or making a copy of it. To meet these security requirements, 
in this research work, the proxy re-encryption algorithm is finely tweaked and along with it, a 
novel way of leveraging the security features of the recipient’s device (iOS) is proposed: by having 
the proxy re-encrypt the data with re-encryption key and send it to the user block by block. The 
proxy sends a subsequent block only after making sure that the previous block of decrypted data 
has been discarded from the user’s device. Each block gets stored at the same location in device 
memory, replacing a previous block. This block-by-block functionality has been implemented in 
order to ensure two things (i) To enable one-time access to user by making sure that previous block 
of data in the device memory has been modified by replacing it with the next block of data (ii) To 
provide additional security by sending only one block of data each time and waiting for the hashed-
decrypted block from the user (for verification), thus assuring that the data is being read by the 
authorized user each time. The data owner provides a copy of the hashed decrypted data to the 
proxy beforehand. This unique variant of proxy re-encryption that exploits the security features of 
an iOS device to make an attempt to restrict the receiver from storing or duplicating the sensitive 
information transferred, is the core essence of this thesis work. 
From the experimental evaluation and results it is observed that the proposed scheme can 
be effectively used to share sensitive data with authorized users while trying to prevent the users 
from sharing with unauthorized users. The results also show that the proposed scheme only 
contributes to a negligible computational and storage overhead at the proxy server and, at the data 
owner end it doesn’t add any significant overhead in terms of computation, storage and 
communication. This proves that the proposed scheme is practical, without adding any notable 
overhead to the original proxy re-encryption algorithm. 
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CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW 
Information Security 
Introduction 
Information [1] is any resource or data that is valuable for individuals and organizations. 
In today’s competitive world, with the growing multitude of business enterprises, research and 
scientific advancements, information is a valuable asset. Sensitive data must be preserved – it 
cannot be changed, modified or exchanged without authorization. For instance, a message could 
be altered amid transmission by somebody intercepting it, before it actually makes it to the 
intended recipient. Be it the formula for a synthetic gene or the software for a new technology or 
a recipe for a popular beverage, there is a necessity to protect this information from untrusted and 
pernicious entities. Whether the information is in storage, processing or transit, there is always a 
dire need to protect it against unauthorized usage and sharing, unapproved alteration or denial of 
service to legitimate users. Information security deals with the measures that are necessary to 
identify and counter any such attacks. 
Many sorts of information must be kept private. Obvious cases include credit and debit 
card numbers, health records, business strategies, etc. The integrity of information is likewise 
critical [2]. Compromised information, and loss of sensitive data, imposes a greater threat to the 
data owners. Any data is valuable only if it is accurate, not if its modified to somebody's advantage. 
Lastly, data is not valuable if it is not accessible. For instance, if the data storage servers on a 
network fail to function due to some malicious activity, the information stored will not be available 
to its legitimate users. Attacks [3] on private and sensitive data come in a variety of forms, for 
example, ransomware, fraud, identity theft, malware and phishing attacks.  
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Figure 1. Threats to Security 
 
Cloud Service Providers 
As of late, an expanding number of user's data move from being put away on local 
computers to live in huge data servers available in the cloud. While this is exceptionally helpful 
and spares clients from investing in extensive hard drives and other costly equipment, it presents 
the issue that the owner of the information is not in entire control of the information any longer. 
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Truth be told, much of the time, the information is really situated on remote servers where there 
are legitimate partialities extremely separating from those authorized by the data owner’s own 
laws and policies. 
While looking into the acts of today's most well-known Cloud Service Providers (CSPs), 
it rapidly turned out to be evident that some of them are seriously ailing critical security measures 
[4]. Firstly, most CSPs do not offer any type of customer side encryption. This implies if there is 
encryption present by any stretch of the imagination, this occurs on the server side as the 
documents arrive. This is insecure as it implies that the CSPs themselves are the key holders and 
thus capable of decoding. While some CSPs do offer customer side encryption, this approach 
additionally includes shortcomings once clients attempt to share the documents with other 
unauthorized users [5]. Customer side encryption implies that the information encryption happens 
prior to uploading to CSP. At the point when clients share records in client side encrypted cloud 
environments, the CSPs can still figure out how to decrypt the information before encrypting them 
with the end-user’s public key. This implies eventually at some point amid this transfer, the CSPs 
handle the information as plaintext. A few CSPs straightforwardly admit these abilities, however 
they all guarantee that they would never decode any information without a justifiable reason. 
Additionally, it is a typical claim that just a modest bunch of their designers have the vital 
accreditations to decode the information. Be that as it may, from a client's perspective, these 
guarantees won't be satisfactory.  
These issues alone exclusively keep the discussion open about whether these frameworks 
are secure enough. Besides, they lead to basis of this thesis work, which tries to offer a framework 
for sharing documents between clients just once, without letting any CSP to decrypt the data. 
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Access Control in Cloud Service Providers 
 Access control is used to trust the identity of an application by another application. Access 
control is a collection of various techniques and methods to determine the legitimate entrance to 
activities by correct users based upon on their privileges and preconfigured permissions in the 
security policy that is defined by the owner [6].  
 The importance of access control systems is primarily to restrict the user to do exactly what 
they are supposed/authorized to do and protect the information from external unauthorized access. 
In today’s world there are many models, technologies and methods to generate an access control 
system (ACS). Every ACS has its own techniques, designs and functions to authorize a user, which 
are obtained from a set of policies set by the owner of data. 
 As discussed earlier, cloud computing environment is open and can be shared with other 
users. CSPs need to have strengthened rules and policies and access control for restricting users to 
access their resources. Also, they should possess the ability to monitor which cloud users are 
accessing data accurately. As each and every cloud has its own unique features such as on-demand 
services, mobility or location, it is very important to have proper access control on the data which 
is being shared with the users on these cloud servers. 
 In the beginning days of information technology and computing, researchers came to know 
the value of preventing users form accessing the data owned by others on shared systems.  In order 
to address this issue, various access control models were introduced in which user’s identity was 
the main index to allow access to the resources on the system. This model is called as Identity 
Based Access Control(IBAC). But, with the growth of number of users across various connected 
networks, this model was weak to defend such a large group of users. Many advanced models were 
developed which included various security levels based on categories such as owner, group or 
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public to manage access. As the number of users is growing, it became more and more difficult to 
manage access and protect resources from unauthorized users. This lead to the development of 
various advanced access control based models of which few are discussed below.	
 
i. Role based access control 
A new access control method, Role Based Access Control was developed (RBAC) [7], 
which is a characteristic approach to control access to the information or resources in large 
organizations and enterprises [8]. RBAC basically determines a particular user’s access to the data 
or system based on the job role. In RBAC, the role of each user is defined by the minimum number 
of permissions or accesses that are required for a particular job to be done by that user. To a user, 
the permissions can be either added or deleted as per the requirements of the organization. A user 
in RBAC model of an organization can have more than one role to observe or, can be a contributor 
to more than one group depending on the position in that organization. For instance, an employee 
of an enterprise can be a contributing member of board members group and also employees group. 
As the RBAC was implemented across the administrative domains with increased number of users, 
problems raised as it was proven to be difficult to reach an agreement to a particular role’s 
privileges. 
ii. Mandatory Access control 
In mandatory access control, a central authority will be in command of providing access 
decision to a subject that requests the information in objects or objects itself. MAC assigns access 
class to both subject and object in order to secure the flow of information flowing between them. 
Security labels are used to classify the objects based on the confidentiality of the information 
present in them. Security levels are used to reflect the trustworthiness of the subjects in this model. 
Bell and Lapadula model, which is also known as multilevel security, uses properties like: no write 
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down and no read up. This model was not capable of protecting the integrity of the objects. Then 
Biba, a newer model was developed using the same principles as that of Bell-Lapadula model 
which protect the integrity of information as well as protecting the confidentiality. These models 
fail to guarantee a full confidentiality of the information. This model is also extremely expensive 
and impractical to be implemented and deployed in the cloud service providers. 
iii. Discretionary Access control 
The Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model provides the owners of the sensitive 
information the capability of restricting access to their information based on the identities of the 
users or the participation of the users in specific groups. This model is used in the environments 
where high level protection of data is not required as it is less secure compared to Mandatory based 
access control(MAC). DAC is most widely used in commercial operating systems such as Unix 
and windows as it is more easy to implement and more flexible in usage compared to other models 
[9]. DAC can be executed by two distinct techniques, access control matrix or identity-based 
access control [10]. This model has many issues in cloud computing as it depends upon allowing 
the owners of objects to control access permissions to objects. For example, there is no method to 
ease the management of improper rights given by the owners to the users. Also, DAC doesn’t have 
the ability to deal with virus, attackers which can inherit the access permission [11] of others and 
get access to the information or objects. Along with that, users can pass on their access rights to 
other unauthorized users, which can violate the confidentiality of the objects. This model is not 
scalable for the cloud computing requirements of today’s world.  
 Thus with today’s growing needs, traditional access control methods will not be sufficient 
to protect the Confidentiality, Integrity and availability of the data. There have been other access 
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control methods proposed later, which provide location based or time based access control of the 
data in addition to above mentioned traditional methods. 
iv. Location Based Access Control(LBAC) 
In order to mitigate the drawbacks of logical security mechanisms and to match the trend 
and integrate with cyber-physical systems, location-based security mechanisms have been 
proposed. Location based access control(LBAC), using geo-locators sends the current location of 
the end-user’s device to the access control decision systems [12]. 
 This technique provides the location specific security policies and enforces it into the 
system. This system will combine with one of the above mentioned traditional access control 
systems and provide this functionality. This mechanism can be used for applications such as 
restricting the user to access the data from a particular room. LBAC takes all the contextual 
information as input, it is part of context-sensitive access control systems [13]. LBAC is very 
useful in providing security to highly confidential data where users are not allowed to access the 
data out of a particular building (e.g.: Pentagon). Along with the location, this mechanism also 
correlates with access rights of the user to provide security on the basis of user’s rights as well. 
v. Time based Access Control(TBAC) 
Though LBAC in combination with conventional access control methods provide strong 
security to the object from the subjects, some applications will not be benefitted enough from the 
above mentioned access control mechanisms. For example, an application should provide access 
to the data (e.g.: videos) based on the time period. As certain group of users might purchase 
different type of services which are provided by the application during certain time intervals of a 
day. In order to achieve this, we need a time based protocol. In the beginning of the time slot, each 
authority can re-grant/revoke the attributes to the objects in its domain to/from any user. These 
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kind of mechanisms will be very helpful in time sharing applications such as video sharing, public 
lockers etc.  
Problem Statement 
 As we have seen, there have been a variety of protocols proposed so far to restrict 
information access to users of CSPs, including a wide range of access control mechanisms, 
cryptographic algorithms, authentication protocols and data protection schemes. So far these 
access control mechanisms are efficient enough to address the security concerns in specific 
scenarios and the mechanism that’s best to use is entirely dependent on the use-case scenario. One 
distinct use-case that hasn’t been addressed by any of the access control mechanisms described 
above is the situation in which the information owner needs to just share the information safely to 
the approved user just once, without giving him/her the benefits to store or make a duplicate of the 
information or to transfer it to others. This thesis work focuses greatly on addressing the concerns 
in such use-case scenarios, to provide restricted access control of the data by end-user.  
 This research makes use of a third party server (proxy) to safely share the information from 
the owner to an approved end user just once and to keep the user from copying the information 
and offering it to other unapproved users. To achieve this, this research proposes (i) a variation of 
a relatively new cryptographic scheme, Proxy Re-encryption [22], which offers the information 
owner an approach to safely share his/her information by means of the intermediary server (proxy) 
via a secure SSL/TLS [15] channel, (ii) a novel method of utilizing some of the key security 
features of the user’s gadget (iOS). The key concepts which lay the foundation of this thesis are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
This work would be very valuable when one wants to share the sensitive information 
through a third party cloud service provider and restrict the end users to store or share the data 
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with other unauthorized users. This mechanism can be handy in the applications such as snapchat, 
where the pictures of the users are not supposed to be stored in the device. Though there is a 
possibility of users taking a picture of the data with another camera, still they won’t be able to 
obtain the corresponding metadata of the original file. This system can be beneficial in sharing 
highly confidential data where the users are not authorized to view the data more than once and 
also not share with other unauthorized users. For example, a corrupt government official can be 
able to sell the government data to a third party and get away. In order to prevent these kind of 
situations, we can restrict the user to view the data block by block to get one-time access and 
prevent users from sharing data with others. Another advantage is, the proxy server will never be 
capable of decrypting the information though it possesses the re-encryption keys that would be 
useful for the end-user to decrypt the information. The data is always stored in an encrypted format 
at the proxy. So the data owner doesn’t have to be available all the time, to restrict access to 
information. The data owner only has to transfer the encrypted data to the proxy just once, initially. 
Later, the proxy server manages all the data transfers going out to the end-user securely.  
Roadmap 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, the underlying key concepts 
that lay the foundation for this thesis work are discussed. The related work in this research area is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the proposed one-time access of data and the 
underlying architecture are described, along with the use case scenario. The implementation details 
are also elaborated. Later in Chapter 5, the experimental results and performance evaluation are 
detailed. Lastly, the concluding remarks and future work in this area are outlined in Chapter 6.  
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 CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 
Technical Background 
Data Encryption to ensure Security 
Data encryption refers to the mathematical computations and algorithmic schemes 
involved in the transformation of electronic information into an unreadable form, called cipher 
text, which can't be easily comprehended by anybody apart from the authorized entities by making 
use of ciphers or cryptographic algorithms. Encryption is the best approach to achieve information 
security. This keeps intruders from accessing private information.  
 Today, there are a wide range of data encryption protocols, yet not all are reliable. Data 
encryption schemes are broadly categorized into two classifications: symmetric encryption 
schemes and asymmetric encryption schemes. 
Symmetric and Asymmetric encryption schemes have one thing in common that - they both 
provide a way to conceal the contents of a plaintext so that unwanted users can't access or decode 
it. Be that as it may, they are fairly different in their individual underlying executions. 
Symmetric Encryption Schemes 
 Symmetric encryption schemes provide two entities a secret way of message 
communication by sharing a secret key that is known only to them. The messages exchanged 
between the two entities will be encrypted and decrypted by utilizing the same secret key. 
Examples of such schemes include Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) [16]. These schemes are hard to initiate as both the entities must share the secret 
key between them by some trusted means (usually by following a key distribution protocol or via 
a trusted third-party), without an outsider finding out about it. In any case, once the key sharing is 
successful, symmetric encryption schemes work well in providing information security. However, 
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if you need to store the key on a server or on a gadget (e.g. in an application), or in the event that 
you transmit it unprotected, then once an attacker accesses that key, your encryption is futile. Also, 
it's vital to note that regardless of the fact that your information is encrypted, the end user or 
application needs access to the decoded information to carry out its work. This implies if the end 
user or application is itself compromised, at the end of the day the encryption is once again futile. 
One way you can viably protect against this is to implement the encryption in a manner that 
information is encrypted when it leaves the owner’s PC, leaving the key only in the owner's 
possession and storing just incomprehensible encrypted information at the server or end user 
application. However, that, obviously, diminishes the usefulness of numerous server-side 
implementations that may need to use the decoded information to work. 
Asymmetric Encryption Schemes 
 Like symmetric encryption schemes, Asymmetric or Public Key Encryption also takes 
meaningful information, encrypts it, and decrypts it again at the other side, yet there's a contrast: 
distinct keys are utilized at each end. Data owner utilizes a Public key to encrypt the information, 
and at the other end the decrypter utilizes the corresponding private (secret) key to decrypt it. Since 
Asymmetric Key Encryption lays the foundation for proxy re-encryption, the cryptographic 
scheme which is the basis of this work, this thesis document will give greater detail and explanation 
of the asymmetric key encryption schemes, contrasted with the other cryptographic protocols and 
algorithms. 
 In particular, in the Asymmetric cryptographic schemes, both sides have their own unique 
key pair. The key pair comprises of one private (secret) key that’s exclusively known only to one 
side and a public key. The Public key, as the name suggests, is quite public; it can and ought to be 
distributed. (This is the reason why asymmetric encryption is frequently called as public key 
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encryption.) But the private key must be kept secured and secret, just like the key for symmetric 
encryption schemes. The great thing is that, this can be done easily since just a single user needs 
access to the secret key: the user who is the intended recipient for that encrypted information. An 
impressive and quite useful property of this public-private key pair is that the key generation 
function takes the private key as input and gives out a unique public key. There is a unique 
mathematical relationship between a private key and its matching public key. As long as the 
mathematical relationship is secure, there is no functional approach to reverse engineer the 
computations and generate the private key by just knowing only the public key. So, the same data 
owner can encrypt the same data with ‘n’ number of users’ public keys and send it over to the ‘n’ 
end users and for each user’s public key, the corresponding private key is unique (this is a must!) 
and known only to that user. So interceptors cannot decode or extract the secret message since 
there is no shared key. The end user is not obliged to share the secret private key with anyone 
including the sender, which is the subtle and most advantageous distinction between public key 
and symmetric encryption schemes.  
A few public key encryption protocols have one extra essential feature: the capacity to 
cryptographically sign the information. In these schemes, the private key is utilized to make the 
digital signature, and the public key is utilized to authenticate the user. You can therefore 
demonstrate that, if you receive the information with a digital signature and that can be successfully 
decrypted with the corresponding public key, it proves that the information is signed with the right 
private key, thus authenticating the sender. Thus, public key encryption schemes are capable of 
efficiently eliminating the key sharing issue of symmetric encryption schemes. 
Though public key encryption schemes [17] are efficient as described above, since their 
security is hugely dependent on calculations involving extremely large prime numbers, more than 
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300 digits in length, their execution time and performance is poor as opposed to symmetric 
encryption schemes. Due to this, usually public key encryption schemes are used to share secret 
keys between two entities, before consequently shifting to a symmetric encryption scheme for the 
subsequent data transfers. 
The following gives an outline of what most asymmetric key cryptosystems depends on 
for security: the computationally hard problems based either on the discrete logarithm Problem 
(DLP), e.g., Diffie Hellman Key exchange protocol [18], or on RSA [19]. Besides, DLP-based 
cryptosystems are either based on elliptic curve Algorithms [20] or on ElGamal [21]. 
Figure 2. Public key cryptosystems 
 
Proxy Re-encryption 
Proxy Re-encryption is a relatively new cryptographic technique. It is a much advanced 
scheme compared to the existing asymmetric or symmetric encryption schemes, taking into 
account the security advantages it brings with it to achieve a secure communication between two 
entities. In this scheme, a proxy server such as a CSP will re-encrypt an already encrypted message, 
so that a different secret key can decrypt it. This will be possible only if the owner of the message 
permits the CSP, and the owner does the first stage of encryption with his private key. The owner 
also generates the re-encryption key specific to the end-user by combining his own private key and 
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the recipient’s public key. Since this scheme involves a private key and public key, it can be called 
as an extension of public key cryptosystem.  
Let’s consider the following example to understand proxy re-encryption better. Suppose, 
Alice and Bob are colleagues in an organization and Alice wants to forward her emails temporarily 
to Bob, which are encrypted under Alice’s public key. So Alice generates a re-encryption key and 
forwards her emails along with the re-encryption key to an email server or to Bob himself. So, Bob 
can use the re-encryption key to convert the email into encrypted form under Bob’s public key and 
then Bob can decrypt the emails by using his own private key. All this can happen without Alice 
revealing her private key to bob. This is the beauty of proxy re-encryption. In the above example, 
Alice doesn’t have to trust the email server completely as it cannot decrypt the email without Bob’s 
private key.   
 Ateniese, Fu, Green and Hohenberger(AFGH) published their improved proxy re-
encryption scheme [22]. This thesis implements a tweaked version of AFGH proxy re-encryption 
algorithm which is capable of solving all the three weaknesses of BBS scheme. AFGH algorithm 
is also based on Elgamal cryptosystem, as well as on bilinear maps. In the following subsections, 
the bilinear maps and AFGH algorithm are described in detail. 
Bilinear Maps - Pairing based cryptography 
 As mentioned earlier, AFGH is based on bilinear maps. So, to understand AFGH we need 
to familiarize the bilinear maps. Let’s begin with gaining an understanding of what pairing-based 
cryptography is. A pairing provides cyclic groups with the below mentioned properties.  Here is a 
description of groups and cyclic groups: 
Groups - A group (G, •) in discrete mathematics is a set of elements G with an operation ‘•’ that 
forms a new element by combining two elements and is denoted as a•b. The binary operation ‘•’ 
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can be anything like addition, subtraction, division, mapping etc. Also, a•b should satisfy the 
following properties.  
Closure: For all a, b in G, the result of the operation, a • b ∈ G.  
Associativity: For all a, b and c in G, (a • b) • c = a • (b • c). 
Identity element: There exists e ∈ G such that, for all elements a in G, such that a • e = e • a = a. 
Inverse element: For any a∈ G, there exists a-1∈ G, such that a • b = b • a = e, where b = a-1 and 
e is the identity element. 
Cyclic group - A group is a cyclic group if it can be generated from a single element. All the 
elements in the cyclic group are exponentials to a specific element called a generator ‘g’. A 
generator can generate a cyclic group, such that all the elements in that group can be written as 
power of ‘g’. 
Bilinear Maps 
 
 Let G1, G2, and Gt are the cyclic groups of the same order q. A bilinear map [23] from G1 
× G2 to Gt is a function e: G1 × G2 → Gt such that for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, a, b ∈ ℤ,  
e(ua , vb ) = e (u, v) ab. 
A Bilinear map associates pairs of elements from G1 and G2 which are two distinct groups with 
elements in another group Gt, so they are also called as pairings. This definition accepts degenerate 
maps which delineate to the identity of Gt. 
AFGH Algorithm 
Having gained an understanding of the fundamentals of pairing-based cryptography and 
bilinear mapping, let’s now move ahead to a detailed elaboration on the technical aspects of AFGH 
algorithm.  
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Let’s assume 𝔾$𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝔾)to be cyclic groups of order p. Let ‘e’ be a bilinear map e: 𝔾$×𝔾$	 → 𝔾). 
The random generator be ‘g’ and g ∈ 	𝔾$	and Z = e(g,g) ∈ 	𝔾).  
Key generation 
Data Owner key pair: 
Secret key, SKA = a ∈ 	ℤ-, a is randomly selected.  
Public key, 𝑃𝐾0= 𝑔2.  
Re-encryption key: 
𝑅𝐾0→4 	= 	𝑔67 , here ‘a’ belongs to data owner (Alice from the example) and ‘b’ belongs to end-
user (Bob). 
Encryption: 
Let 𝑚 be the message to be encrypted and 𝑚	 ∈ 	𝔾). In the first stage of encryption, it is 
encrypted using public key 𝑃𝐾0 such that 𝑆𝐾0 can decrypt the data and  also assigned a delegate 
with its private key after re-encryption. Let   ′𝑟′ be a randomly selected element in ℤ-. The cipher 
text tuple will be CA = (m.	𝑍=,	𝑔2=). Here, ‘a’ belongs to public key of Alice. 
Re-encryption: 
To convert the above cipher text from Alice into a cipher text which can only be decrypted 
by Bob by his private key, we have to use the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the data. The re-
encryption of the data converts CA = (m.	𝑍=,	𝑔2=) into CB = (m.	𝑍=,	𝑍=>), where 𝑍=>	 = e (𝑔=2, 𝑔67), 𝑔=2	= CA and 𝑔67 = 𝑅𝐾0→4. 
Decryption at User: 
Message m can be decrypted by computing the following.  
m = @A.BC DA7,D67 E/6 = @
A.B(@A6)E/6 . 
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The Proxy server cannot compute 𝑔67	by knowing 𝑔76 and therefore it is unidirectional under 
the inverse exponent assumption, equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman Assumption.  Also, this scheme 
is collusion resistant and non-transitive, which means proxy server will not be able to compute 
either a or b with the help of 𝑔76. Apart from bob’s public key, Alice doesn’t need any additional 
information to compute re-encryption key and bob can decrypt the message by using his private 
key alone, so this scheme is non-interactive and no secret sharing between Alice and Bob. From 
this we can say that AFGH proxy re-encryption algorithm is able to solve all the three weaknesses 
of BBS scheme mentioned earlier. 
 
SSL and TLS for secure data sharing 
 In order to provide a secure end-to-end communication utilizing the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP), Secure Sockets Layer Protocol, a 2-layered protocol is proposed. SSL is efficient 
in authenticating and providing data confidentiality and integrity in end-to-end communications. 
Because of this, SSL is amongst the most popular security protocols on the Internet. Later, TLS is 
proposed with the objective of giving a standard usage of SSL [15]. On account of this, SSL and 
TLS are mostly synonymous. TLS variant 1.0 assumed control after SSL variant 3.0. SSL utilizes 
a blend of symmetric and asymmetric key encryption schemes to secure an association between a 
web or a mail server, and a client machine, often communicating over the web or on any TCP/IP 
framework. SSL runs on top of the network layer [24] and the transport layer, using which traffic 
can be routed between a server and a client and transfer of data takes place respectively, and below 
the application layer protocols, for example, the Simple Mail Transport Protocol and HTTP. 
The SSL/TLS protocol incorporates two sub-protocols: The Handshake protocol and the 
Record protocol. The Handshake protocol lets the user and server to verify one another and to 
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agree on an encryption protocol and a Message Authentication Code (MAC) protocol and also the 
transfer of cryptographic keys, such as public keys for encryption of information or session keys 
for authentication. The Record protocol deals with how the data needs to be exchanged between 
the client and server using SSL, including specifications for how the information is to be 
transmitted and how it is to be decrypted at the receiver. Prior to any information transmission 
between a server and a user, SSL/TLS begins the Handshake Protocol. 
 
Security features provided by Mobile devices 
 Modern day mobile devices provide a wide range of security features [25] suitable for the 
Mobile Operating Systems (MOS). The widely deployed mobile operating systems in the market 
today are the Android OS and iOS (iPhone OS). With the immense utilization of mobile devices 
in today’s world, likewise, the security requirements for mobile devices are also immense. These 
security prerequisites for mobile OS are: Application Sandboxing, Data Storage Format, 
Encryption, Built-in Antivirus and Memory Randomization. Sandboxing for an application 
provides authorizations, registries, kernel access and other privileges. Memory randomization 
guarantees that the memory areas of a mobile app and device shared libraries are altogether 
randomized at the application and/or device start-up. Encryption is performed at the inter-process 
communication level or on the disk or folder/filer level. It is hard to talk in support or against the 
android or the iOS frameworks regarding better security. The method of utilizing the device plays 
a noteworthy part in deciding the security level. As far as capacity is concerned, all information is 
kept in Data Storage Format. Information can be stored in external (e.g., Cloud storage) or internal 
storage. In this research, an iOS device is used for exemplifying the proposed proxy-re-encryption 
scheme, to provide one-time secure access to information. iOS provides some exclusive security 
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features that actually make such kind of implementations practical and feasible, to enhance the 
security even more. These security features are outlined as follows: 
• Address Space Layout randomization: Address Space Layout/Memory randomization is a 
feature in which the application memory and other shared libraries in a device are randomly 
arranged. This is essential to prevent any virus or malicious code to read the memory of a 
running application. The malicious code need to locate the correct memory region or 
location of the process it needs to corrupt/attack and this is challenging for them since the 
memory is randomized. Along with memory randomization, iOS prevents buffer overflows 
and uses advanced code signing technology [26] – a procedure that is mandatory to allow 
unauthorized applications to run on a device, in which any new third party application need 
to be approved via a certificate issued by Apple. It also makes sure that a signed third party 
application cannot load unsigned code libraries or use a self-modifying code structure.  
• Application Sandboxing: Apple iOS application sandboxing has been characterized as a 
fine-grained control that constrains the application in accessing the network, file system 
and hardware. All the applications on an iOS device share the same robust sandbox model 
which is less open to the crowd and hence more secure. iOS only lets registered user to 
access the root file-system and other settings of the device, not in an application-level. But 
other mobile OSes [27] rely more on the user to set security as an optional feature for 
applications during installation. 
• Code Signing: All applications on iOS must be signed cryptographically. Even better, the 
signature should be by utilizing an official Apple-issued advanced digital certificate, or 
from an enterprise installed on the device for custom applications. This keeps unsigned 
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application from running on the device, including misused code. Apple just signs 
applications sold through the App Store, limiting the peril of pernicious applications. 
• No Backing Store: Writable information is never deleted from memory by the OS. Rather, 
if the measure of free memory drops beneath a specific limit, the OS requests the running 
applications to free up memory intentionally to make room for new information. 
Applications that neglect to free up enough memory are terminated. In iOS, there is no 
backing store thus pages are never paged out to storage disk, however, read-only pages can 
still be paged in from storage disk as required. 
• Data Storage Format: The iOS devices usually use internal storage and external iCloud 
storage. The built-in internal storage is robust and needs permissions for data access or 
manipulation. The complicated passphrase and Data Protection APIs in an iOS device add 
an extra layer of information security. So iOS makes it hard for the application to access 
storage data. 
• Encryption: All the data in an iOS device is secured via encryption. The MDM APIs [28] 
available in iOS allows wiping the device data remotely by deleting the encryption key for 
that device. Once the encryption key is removed from the hardware, the device is useless. 
One must know the passcode to extract the iOS encrypted file. 
Apple iOS has advanced security design to ensure a robust and secure functionality without 
compromising ease of use. Also, iOS devices do not need an anti-virus since iOS doesn’t leave 
room for external virus to enter the system.   
Having discussed the key technical aspects which form a basis to this thesis work, let us 
move forward to an overview of the existing research work in this field of study. 
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 CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
As discussed in previous chapters, a significant amount of research has been done in the 
past in order to address the security concerns that arise in sharing confidential information through 
a third party cloud storage system. This research work has been categorized and discussed in the 
following subsections. 
Outline of the existing Research in the field of Cloud Security 
The early research that led to the invention of proxy re-encryption algorithms started with 
an original intention to develop a technique which can transform cipher text encrypted with one 
encryption key to another without the decryption of the data. In general, PRE has been developed 
to provide users with delegating ability in the access control implementations [29]. Mambo and 
Okamoto [30] originally introduced Proxy-based re-encryption. In this proxy system the original 
decryptor of the data allows another decryptor to decrypt the cipher text by transforming the cipher 
text. Once the transformation of the cipher text is done the proxy will compute the plain text instead 
of the original decryptor. This was useful if the original decryptor has to deal with huge amount 
decryption operation. This is futile in today’s world unless the proxy server is completely trusted.  
Proxy re-encryption was initially introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss (BBS) in their 
work in [31]. This paper is conceptually based on ElGamal public key cryptosystem. Though it 
was able to provide desired re-encryption function, it is not recommended for practical usage as it 
is transitive, bidirectional and also prone to collusion between proxy server and authorized users. 
The biggest drawback of this scheme was re-encryption key generation which required one of the 
parties to share their secret keys with the other party which is a huge security concern. After the 
introduction of BBS there have been many schemes which focused on enhancing proxy re-
encryption scheme.  
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Recently there have been many proposals to optimize computation overhead at data 
owner or user side. For instance, Son et al. [32] developed an outsourcing conditional PRE (OC-
PRE) which is an innovative public key primitive, this facilitates sharing of sensitive data within 
a group of authorized users without exposing the underlying decryption key or the actual plaintext 
to any member not in the group. This algorithm with an aim to reduce overhead at user sides 
in dealing with the initiation stage. In this algorithm, the owner of data computes the conditional 
value and re-encryption keys to send it to the cloud service provider(CSP) which acts as proxy 
server to perform re-encryption process. If there is a change on association, the owners or users 
just re-calculate the conditional value changing key (CCK) and the CCK will transform the cipher 
text with a new conditional value. This process reduces the re-encryption key generation 
complexity significantly. This scheme performs delegated operations due to two prominent 
characteristics [32].  
(i) Partial re-encryption key generation and decryption phases can be delegated to cloud 
service provider.  
(ii)  Condition value changing phase will also be delegated to CSP with CCK. By 
delegating three phases of CPRE, this scheme significantly reduces burden of a client. 
However, this algorithm only works if there is a change at the user level and won’t be effective if 
there is no change in the original data. 
Attribute based encryption(ABE) also provides a secure way of data sharing where user 
attributes can be used to authenticate the users. It was initially developed in fuzzy identity based 
encryption [33], which is the generalized version of identity based encryption [34]. There have 
been several variants of ABE developed and among them, Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption 
(KP-ABE) [35] a fine grained sharing system of encrypted data, in which the authors developed a 
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unique variant of attribute-based encryption system in which the encryptor uses a set of descriptive 
attributes to uniquely label the encrypted text. Further, the encryptor defines an access structure 
which specifies a mapping of all the private keys and the type of cipher texts each private key can 
decrypt.   
 However, the drawback of KP-ABE is that the owner (encryptor) will not be able to decide 
which user is authorized to decrypt the cipher text. This system is not suitable in some applications 
where we cannot trust the key issuer as data owner has to trust him in issuing the data to authorized 
users only with descriptive attributes. 
 Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [36] is a modified form of KP-
ABE developed by Sahai. In this scheme, all cipher texts are mapped to an access policy of 
attributes and the private keys of the user are related with those set of attributes [37]. The user can 
decrypt the encrypted data if his private key has the attributes of the access policy of the cipher 
text. This scheme works in a reverse method of KP-ABE. By using this method, the data will be 
confidential even when the cloud service provider is untrusted and this scheme is secure against 
the collusion attacks. These methods are close to RBAC conceptually. However, the drawbacks of 
this scheme are complexity involved in fulfilling the enterprise requirements of access controls 
and also the decryption keys support only attributes of the user which are organized as a single set 
logically.  
Distributed ABE [38] is yet another scheme in which an arbitrary number of parties can be 
assembled to maintain the attributes and its corresponding secret keys. This scheme differs greatly 
from CP-ABE where the secret keys will be distributed by only one single central trusted server. 
During the encryption and decryption process, this scheme requires a constant number of pairing 
operations. This scheme also allows to add new users and new attributes during any time 
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dynamically. However, in this scheme the access policies need to be in the form of DNF which is 
NP-Complete to decide if a given DNF is true or not for every variable.  
In [39], Tysowski et al. developed a protocol based on PRE and ABE for providing a secure 
data sharing in mobile cloud computing. The PRE helps to reduce the computation workload at 
the data owner side. The key generation process is shared between mobile data owner and the third 
party trusted servers. However, this algorithm uses a general PRE concept for ciphertext re-
encryption and at the data owner side the re-encryption is still needed for revocation of the access.  
In [40], Kawai developed a flexible Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Proxy Re-
Encryption ( CP-AB-PRE) supporting attribute-based policy update. This protocol allocates the 
re-encryption key generation to a cloud service provider. The author applied key randomization, 
encrypted methodology and adaptive-based encryption [41] as the core concepts. But, for this 
algorithm the complexity is still a big problem for a big size policy as it is not devoted for 
revocation of attributes. 
In [42], the Lightweight Proxy Re-encryption (L-PRE) scheme tries to resolve two costly 
drawbacks of CP-ABE revocation. The L-PRE fully delegates the proxy server to generate re-
encryption key, with which the computation cost at data owner is reduced. Also, the algorithm to 
update key will update the keys of all the effected users in parallel. But, in case of frequent 
revocation of keys, re-encryption keys have to be re-generated all the time and the data owners 
have to submit the data file to the proxy server for generating re-encryption key. 
There have been many proxy re-encryption based schemes proposed with different security 
properties. Chosen ciphertext secure proxy re-encryption [14] scheme is based only on Decisional 
Bilinear Diffie Hellman assumption in the standard model. The authors claim that this scheme is 
secure in arbitrary protocol settings which means secure against chosen cipher text attacks.  
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Identity based re-encryption scheme without random oracles [43], is a scheme in which the 
cipher text is encrypted under a condition along with the user’s identity. The cipher text satisfying 
the given condition can only be transformed by the proxy server and the can be decrypted by the 
authorized user.  
Also, there has been significant research in secure file systems. Cryptographic File System 
(CFS) [44] is the original work in this area. For encryption of an entire directory it uses a single 
key and relies on the underlying file system for authorization writes. This system provides the 
secure storage at file system level through the standard file system interface of Unix for the 
encrypted files. Sensitive text will be never stored on the disk, which also applies for the cloud 
service providers. This system also works for the remote file servers such as Network File 
System(NFS). All the system management functions work without any knowledge of the key in 
this system.  
The access control for remote storage systems can be well controlled by the cryptographic 
techniques [5, 45, 46]. The files are encrypted by the owners using symmetric encryption approach 
with content keys and use the public key of every user to encrypt the content keys. But, when there 
are large number of data owners and users, managing the keys will be very complicated. In case 
of user dynamically leaving or joining the system, the key distribution will add additional 
complexity as it requires the data owners to be online all the time. A few techniques [47]– [50] use 
distributed third party remote servers which are either trusted or semi-trusted to take care of the 
key management and distribution of the data to the customers. As the servers in cloud storage 
systems cannot be completely trusted, we cannot apply the above mentioned techniques for the 
access control. 
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Another variant for secure data sharing is Broadcast Encryption. This concept was first 
introduced by Fiat and Naor [51]. This scheme facilitates for central broadcast site to broadcast to 
a set of arbitrary users while minimizing the transmission related to the key management. 
However, this scheme suffers from one main drawback, which is complexity. The cipher text size 
is of the order O(x(log x)2log n) which increases with increasing  x and n of a x-user collision 
resistant scheme with n subscribers in the system[52].  
Later, there have been many research efforts on this concept. The best known scheme is [52] for 
its efficiency, this scheme is not only dependent on the size of authorized user set but also needs 
the broadcaster to refer the user authorizations to its database. This scheme is fully collusion 
resistant and also securer than any t-user collusion resistant scheme. This scheme works with 
constant size cipher texts and private keys for arbitrary receiver sets. However, broadcast 
encryption scheme cannot provide a non-refutable signature as in PKC, a valid signature can be 
forged which is a concern and intractable problem without the private key of actual signer. 
Therefore, in broadcast encryption the true identity of an individual cannot be guaranteed.  
While much research has been done so far to address the significant security issues in the 
field of secure data sharing via a third party storage system, none explicitly focused on providing 
restricted access to the end-users by preventing them from sharing or replicating the decrypted 
information. This thesis work uniquely differs from the previous works along these lines, by 
proposing a variation of proxy re-encryption and providing restricted access control. Let us dive 
into the technical aspects of the proposed work in next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4. PROPOSED WORK & IMPLEMENTATION 
Secure Data Sharing by Restricting User to one-time Access 
 
Problem Definition 
  
 The main objective of this thesis work is to provide a secure mechanism of sharing files 
with an authorized user through third party cloud servers and also, to restrict the user to access 
data only once and preventing the user to make a copy or share the file contents with others. 
  
  
  
 
                                
              
           
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Underlying architecture of the proposed work 
 
 
In today’s world, due to the massive adoption of third party cloud service providers (CSPs) 
and the incredible flexibility offered by these cloud-based services, everyone wants to outsource 
Proxy re-encryption and 
User data-logging 
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data by storing on the cloud. It is extremely critical for the data owners to make sure that their data 
is securely stored in CSPs as per today’s requirements and standards. The cloud has to be 
trustworthy. If the Cloud security is somehow compromised, then it gets to be a single point of 
failure. One way to achieve security independent of the Cloud is to store the data on the Cloud in 
an encrypted form. Now the crucial part is to decide on the type of encryption scheme to be used 
for this. With symmetric encryption schemes, every time the key is revoked, the whole data needs 
to be encrypted all over with a new key and has to be stored again. This is not scalable when the 
data stored on the cloud is huge. With public key encryption keys, for each user, the data needs to 
be encrypted with his/her private key and stored. This is not scalable when there are a large number 
of authorized users of the data. So we need a way in which data, independent of its size, can be 
shared with a large number of clients and the data should be stored in an encrypted form, thus 
eliminating the need to trust the Cloud. This can be achieved by using Proxy re-encryption 
algorithm. There are several versions of the proxy-based re-encryption schemes and the variant 
which is used in this thesis work is AFGH proxy re-encryption algorithm.  
 
Underlying Architecture 
In this architecture, the owner sends encrypted data to the CSP and whenever an authorized 
user requests for data, the CSP will re-encrypt the data and send it back to that user. The re-
encryption is done such that only that specific user can decrypt the data successfully. Upon 
reception of the data, the user will decrypt it using his/her private key and will be able to read the 
data block by block by communicating with the CSP from time to time to provide credentials to 
access the next block of data.  
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Figure 4. Outline of the proposed variant of proxy re-encryption scheme 
 
In this system, all the interactions from the user will be through a mobile device at the user-
side. For viewing each block of data, the application running on user’s mobile device will 
communicate with the proxy server and upon reception of the block of data, the application 
decrypts the block with the user’s private key. After successful decryption of the current block, it 
again requests the proxy for the next block of data. 
In order to receive the next block of data, the user (via the application running on user’s 
mobile device) has to encrypt the plain text of the previous block with the owner’s public key PKA 
and the data in the memory block will be replaced with this encrypted data. Hence, the plaintext is 
no longer available to the user. Only after successful execution of this step, the user can receive 
the next block. After this, the user has to send the encrypted data to CSP and wipe off the memory 
block by replacing with 0s. On receiving this encrypted block, the CSP will compute hash value 
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of this block and compare it with the actual hash value sent by the owner initially. If there is a 
match, it stands as a verification and the CSP will send the subsequent block of data to the user. 
This step is implemented in order to ensure that the previous block of data has been read only by 
the authorized user but not by any intruder. It also makes sure that previous block of data has been 
erased. This goes on till all blocks of data have been decrypted and read by the user. 
This system allows the end-user to access the data only once, as CSP will not be authorized 
to send the same block of data more than once unless mentioned otherwise by the data owner. This 
is achieved by keeping track of each user’s (unique id, re-encryption key) pair and deleting the re-
encryption key corresponding to a user after the completion of transaction with that user. 
The communication between the owner and CSP and also between user’s device and the 
CSP is carried out over a highly secure SSL/TLS channel. However, this means that the owner, 
CSP and the user’s device should be capable of supporting SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS helps to 
provide a secure connection as discussed in Chapter 1 and hence all the confidential information 
that is transferred between the user and CSP is protected by the SSL/TLS channel. 
In this system, the private key stored in the user’s device is deleted after each successful 
transfer of the complete information. In other words, the user’s private key is revoked. It is 
important to revoke the private key after every transaction. Otherwise, using the same public-
private key pair for more than one transaction could lead to a potential leak of sensitive data if the 
key has been compromised. For each of the subsequent transactions, a new public-private key pair 
is used by each user. 
The end-user’s implementation has been done on Apple Iphone5s by utilizing the security 
features provided by the iOS operating system like ASLR, code signing, application sandboxing 
and no backing store as described in the introduction section of this document to protect the data.  
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The proposed security protocol has been verified using Scyther tool. It is a tool for 
verification of security protocols automatically. The security protocol analysis done by Scyther 
tool has a framework for modelling adversaries. It supports ideas like, key compromise 
impersonation, adversaries capable of state-reveal queries [53] and weak perfect forward secrecy. 
An elaboration on how exactly this system works and its other implementation details 
follows later in this chapter. 
Illustration of the protocol in detail: 
 Let’s assume Alice wants to share different sets of examination papers with her class 
students such that no two students should have the same set of question papers (QP) and students 
can take the examination during their convenient time. Further, Alice wants to share the question 
paper in a secure and convenient manner. Alice also doesn’t want the students to share question 
papers with each other. As we can see, “Secure Data Sharing-With Restricted User Access” is the 
requirement of Alice. 
 Prior to any communication, Alice as well as all students in her class will generate their 
respective key pair, one public key (PK) and one private key/secret key (SK). This can be obtained 
by calling the key generator functions using crypto.key library which generates a public key and 
its corresponding unique private key per each user.  
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Technically one call is to a function to generate a private key and another call for a function 
to generate a public key.  The crypto.Key.make_priv() is the function to generate an instance of 
any entity for creating public and private keys. 
 Once all the students obtain their key pair, they share their public keys with Alice before 
the question papers are distributed. After receiving the public keys of all the students, Alice will 
generate Re-encryption key for each student.  
 
Figure 5. End-user (student) sends his/her public key to the data owner (Alice) 
 Let us say Bob is one of the students. Alice after receiving public key of Bob, generates 
Re-encryption key(RKAàB). The question paper(QP) will be encrypted with Public key of Alice 
(PKA) which is {QP} PKA. Alice also generates a SHA256 hash value of {QP} PKA i.e., 
SHA256({QP} PKA), Alice uploads all the above information along with hash value to the proxy 
server aka Cloud Service Provider(CSP). Along with this, Alice also uploads metadata related to 
Bob such as unique username of Bob and public key of bob.  
 
Figure 6. Data owner (Alice) uploads the files to server 
 After Alice uploads all this data, CSP will maintain a hash table which stores Bob’s unique 
username as key and all the other information related to Bob as value. The above process will be 
done for each student with whom Alice wants to share the question paper. If there are 100 users, 
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owner will generate 100 re-encryption keys and send them to CSP. All the information that’s stored 
on the CSP is publicly available and hence it is not a security concern. 
 Upon a student (Bob) requesting the exam question paper, CSP first generates a random 
text (secret word) of length 18 characters, encrypts with Bob’s public key (PKB) and transfers it to 
Bob’s device. Bob receives this, decrypts with his Secret Key (SKB) and sends it back to the CSP. 
CSP verifies the secret word and if there’s a match, will divide the actual file shared by Alice into 
blocks of data (Alice encrypts in such a way that each block could be individually decrypt-able) 
depending upon the size of the file. The information about the block size in terms of bytes is sent 
by Alice beforehand. After this division is made, each block of data is re-encrypted with RKA->B 
and sent to Bob. The file is divided into 3 blocks in this case and each block of file is denoted as 
QPi (i denotes for block number), first block will be QP1. 
Figure 7. Proxy Server sends data to the end user (student) block by block 
On receiving each block of data, Bob will decrypt it with his secret key (SKB), after reading 
the contents of the block, the plain text has to be encrypted with the public key of Alice (PKA) and 
the application will replace the plain text in the memory of the iOS device with this encrypted data. 
The encrypted data({QPi}PKA) is sent back to CSP. CSP after receiving each block of data 
calculates the SHA-256 value and compares it with hash value sent by Alice in the beginning. If 
they both match, CSP will send subsequent blocks of data and continues this procedure till the end 
of file is reached. After completion of file transfer, information related to Bob will be deleted from 
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the CSP and Bob also revokes his private key(SKB). For a new file, again the whole process should 
be repeated.  
 
Figure 8. Timing Diagram of the data sharing system 
Implementation 
 The implementation of this system is composed of 3 distinct applications which run on 3 
different machines impersonating Alice, CSP and Bob. Throughout this development, Python 
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script is used to develop the data Owner and CSP applications while the iOS app has been 
implemented using Xcode and Objective-C.  
For the implementation, MacBook Pro running macOS 10.12.2 with Intel Core i5 processor and 
Processor Speed: 2.7 GHz is used as the Owner’s (Alice’s) device, an Ubuntu 16.04 Virtual 
Machine is used as the Cloud Service Provider (Proxy Server) and an iOS app using Xcode and 
running on iPhone 5s emulator is used at the end User(Bob). 
Cryptography 
 As mentioned earlier, the cryptographic scheme used in this project is the implementation 
of the AFGH proxy re-encryption algorithm.  This algorithm is a relatively new addition to the 
world of cryptography. Proxy re-encryption algorithm is an asymmetric-key encryption which has 
significantly efficient features in sharing the data through a third party service provider. The most 
important feature of PRE algorithm is its ability to give the decryption rights to an authorized 
person without letting the CSP learn the plain text. As discussed earlier in this paper, AFGH proxy 
re-encryption algorithm is based upon Elgamal Crypto Systems and pairing based cryptography 
which is also known as bilinear maps. The AFGH proxy re-encryption algorithm in this paper uses 
a third party library developed by ZeroDB which is a python code wrapper around bilinear maps 
library, named the Java Pairing Based Cryptography (JPBC 2.0.0) [54] library developed in java. 
The JPBC library is a Java implementation of the Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) [55] which 
was developed in C language. Ben Lynn is the developer of the PBC library who is also the author 
of [56]. 
 The library mentioned above was used to develop the actual application which will 
implement the protocol described in this architecture. The implementation of Alice and Cloud 
service provider applications is completely done in python. 
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 This python script also includes implementation of the TLS/SSL for all the data requests 
and data transfers among the different devices in this protocol. The Python implementation of 
TLS/SSL socket connection includes the SSL library in python. The SSL library in python is a 
wrapper around OpenSSL library which was initially developed in C. By implementing this, the 
Owner and proxy Server are capable of providing secure connections.  
 This part of the code explains implementation of the iOS application which runs on an 
iPhone 5s emulator for testing purposes.  
In the iOS application, the user will initially have to send a request to CSP providing his 
unique user-id. On receiving the request, the CSP will send him a secret word for user 
authorization. Once the user is authorized, CSP will start sending each block of data, then the iOS 
application will decrypt and store the data in a memory block. After user reads the data, the 
application requests for a new block of data. For receiving the new block of data, the application 
will have to encrypt the current block of data with the public key of Alice. The memory block is 
modified with the encrypted data and after this encrypted data is sent to CSP, the whole block will 
be replaced with 0x00. This is taken care by the iOS application to make sure that the data has 
been completely erased from the memory. CSP on receiving this data will compute the hash value 
and compares it with the hash value sent by Alice earlier. This whole process repeats until all the 
blocks of data have been read by Bob. So, no matter how many blocks of data is available, all the 
data blocks will be stored in the same memory block of iOS device. The memory block size is set 
to 10kB by the owner and data is divided as per the block size of memory. This is achieved by 
using the security features of iOS such as ASLR which makes it exceptionally difficult for the 
attacker to know the exact location of code in the memory of the device. This prevents the attackers 
from reading the data in memory or to hook their code in the memory to take over the system.  
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Application sandboxing prevents any application from influencing other application’s 
behavior or to access the shared data, but this can be overridden if both the applications explicitly 
allow and support such communication. This feature helps to prevent other applications trying to 
influence the behavior of the end-user’s application running on iOS device. With the help of this 
security feature we can prevent other applications trying to affect the behavior the user’s 
application and also prevent the other malicious applications from doing the runtime memory copy 
of the secure sharing system’s end-user’s application.  
 Code signing makes sure that all the applications running on the device are 
cryptographically signed by official Apple digital certificate. This helps to prevent unauthorized 
attacker’s application from running on the device which can exploit code and effect the end-user’s 
application.  
iOS doesn’t allow backing store, which means writable data is never removed from the 
memory by the operating system to store on disk in case of memory shortage on iOS device. If 
free memory falls below a threshold value, the operating system asks running applications to free 
up memory voluntarily to make room for other applications. This is useful in this research because 
it prevents the storage of application data from the memory to storage disk. This is helpful because 
if the data in memory is stored in storage disk, there might be a possibility of attacker stealing the 
data from storage disk and it will be difficult to erase the data permanently from the storage disk. 
All these features help to achieve the desired safety requirements of the end-user’s application in 
this thesis.  
This process makes sure that the data from each block is not stored in the iPhone after 
reading and also user cannot share this data with others. One important assumption in this 
implementation is that the iOS device used for sharing system is not jail broken. In a jail broken 
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device, there is a possibility that users can read the run time memory of an application and also 
can do a memory copy of the data into other applications and perform the restricted actions. So, 
all the above mentioned features will be intact only in an iOS device which is not jailbroken.  
Another important feature of the application is that we use only a single block of memory 
with a fixed size by the application to read any number of blocks of data. For instance, if the size 
of memory block is set to 10kb, each block of data will be of size 10kb and in case of last block 
which might be less than 10kb it is padded with 0s to fit into the complete block to prevent any 
possibilities of leaking the data and application wont display the padded data. In case of data size 
more than the size of memory block, extra data will be discarded which might lead to loss of data. 
So, the owner of the data has to make sure that each data block cannot exceed the memory size set 
by the application running on the iOS device. 
 As noted earlier, the entire communication between the iOS app and CSP will happen on 
an SSL/TLS secure channel by using the SSL/TLS libraries of IOS. 
 
Formal Analysis of the proposed protocol 
The proposed protocol in this thesis work has been verified by using an automated security 
protocol verification tool, Scyther v1.1.3 to provide a formal security analysis. This tool provides 
a framework for modeling attackers for the analysis of security protocols, supports all kinds of 
adversaries ranging from low-level to high level. It also supports the idea of forward secrecy, 
adversaries capable of state-reveal queries and key compromise impersonation [53]. This tool is 
mainly used to find problems in the way a protocol is designed and constructed. The following 
security attributes have been analyzed by using the scythe security protocol analysis tool. 
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Key-compromise Impersonation Resilience: Even if the long term private key of Alice is 
compromised to adversary, the protocol should be resilient enough to mitigate any security leaks. 
Known key Security: The compromise of each session key should not be able to compromise the 
session keys of other runs i.e. each run of protocol should create a unique secret session key 
between the entities.  
Forward Secrecy: The secrecy of the previously established session keys shouldn’t be affected in 
case if a long term private key is compromised for one or more entities. A partial forward secrecy 
is said to be attained when if not all but some of the entities long term private keys are corrupted 
without compromising the session keys which were previously established. The system is said to 
have attained perfect forward secrecy in cases where, even if all of the long term private keys of 
all the entities are corrupted without compromising the previously established sessions and the 
protocol verification results are shown in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED 
DATA SHARING SYSTEM 
Experimental Setup 
This chapter details the performance evaluation at the data owner side, end-user side and 
on the Proxy Server used in this data sharing system. The Data Owner (Alice) application has been 
implemented on a machine that has 2 Core, 8GB RAM with Intel Core i5 2.7Ghz processor running 
Mac OS 10.12.2. The machine running the Proxy server application is 1 Core, 4GB RAM Ubuntu 
16.04 Virtual Machine residing on MacBook Pro with i5 2.7Ghz processor running Mac OS 
10.12.2 and 8GB RAM. The end-user’s application used in this sharing system has been developed 
on an Apple IPhone 5S with 1GB RAM running with 1.3GHZ dual-core Apple A7 processor and 
IOS 10.2 Operating system. 
 
Performance evaluation Results 
Performance of Data Owner:  
The performance of the data owner has been measured by calculating the time taken to 
generate a re-encryption key + the time to produce the first stage of cipher text + the time to 
calculate the SHA256 hash value of cipher text + the time involved in creating a file with all these 
details and to have it ready to share. The process has been carried for multiple users (students, as 
per example in 4th chapter).  
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Figure 9. Performance evaluation for re-encryption key generation at the Owner side 
 
From the graph in Figure 10 above, it is clear that the time taken for generating the above 
data increases linearly as the number of end-users (students) increases. This is because, the owner 
has to generate all the above information for each student separately so the cost is directly 
proportional to the number of users with whom the data owner wants to share the files. Coming to 
the storage overhead, the data owner only has to store his/her own private/public key pair, and 
hence, is negligible as well. 
Performance evaluation of Proxy Server: 
 In this data sharing system, the role of the proxy server is, upon request from the users 
(students, as per example in 4th chapter) it has to re-encrypt the data with the re-encryption key 
and share an encrypted secret word with the authorized user, wait for the response, compare the 
response (the decrypted secret word) with the actual secret word and then authorize the user. After 
the user authorization, it has to start sending the re-encrypted data block by block. For testing 
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purposes, the actual data (the question paper, as per example in 4th chapter) is divided into several 
sections and each section is around 10 kb. While testing for performance evaluation, the user 
requests for each section of data immediately after receiving the previous section.  
 
Figure 10.  Comparison of Computation latency of AFGH and Proposed algorithm 
Scheme with varying data size 
If multiple users request for data at the same time, the process running on the proxy server 
will create separate threads to handle each user. The test is repeated with simultaneous requests by 
3 users and the time taken to handle the 3 users is same as that of a single user. So, for simultaneous 
requests from n number of users, it would take almost the same amount of time for the program 
running on the Proxy Server to handle all the multiple users simultaneously, as each user will be 
handled by a different thread.  
Coming to the storage overhead, the proxy server stores O(n) re-encryption keys, where n 
is the number of authorized users in the system. For one data sharing operation, the proxy server 
transfers one re-encrypted message (in several blocks) plus one encrypted secret word for one 
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authorized user, i.e., the communication overhead is also proportional to the number of authorized 
users.   
 
Figure 11.  Comparison of Computation times of AFGH and Proposed 
Scheme with fixed file size and varying no. of Users 
 
Performance evaluation of the iOS device: 
The role of the iOS device is to display each block of data to the user, send each block and 
request for the subsequent blocks. The performance of the application running on this device has 
been measured by calculating the time taken for the IOS device to display the whole data after 
decrypting the data with the user’s private keys. As the recipient has to perform several decryptions 
for 1 question paper for the testing purposes, the time taken for all decryptions taking place on the 
device is calculated. As the user has to decrypt only one file (divided into n blocks of data) that is 
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shared by the data owner, there is no significant storage overhead on the user side. The following 
table depicts the average time taken (averaged out over 100 runs) for one complete transaction per 
one user, at the Data Owner, Proxy Server and Decryption at the User to transfer a file of 100kB, 
in the existing test setup. 
Table 1. Average Time taken for one complete transaction to transfer a file of 100kB 
Key-Generation(owner) Encryption(Owner) Re-encryption(CSP) Decryption(User) 
2.4 µs 19.4 µs 53.8 µs 29.7 µs 
 
Cryptographic Results 
Key generation:  
In this thesis research, Crypto.key library is used to generate the public and private key 
pairs for both Alice (Data owner) and Bob (authorized user). The following functions shows the 
usage of Crypto.key library to generate the public and private keys. 
Public and Private keys of Alice:  
Alice = crypto.Key.make_priv() à Creates a public-private key pair for Alice 
Alice_private_key = Alice.dump_priv() à gives the private key for Alice( 𝑆𝐾0	). 
Alice_public_key = Alice.dump_pub()  à  gives the public key for Alice 𝑃𝐾0 . 
 𝑃𝐾0 ∶ 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶	𝐾𝐸𝑌	𝑂𝐹	𝐴𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸: 
48207b39342e2a49203d7732652e203d317a820a326c2b4565935e6d20535f7e372482038563202
65a776631202120492028443f7a58665202a6920466a372017d6ef7835224533831204d2063aa 
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𝑃𝐾4: 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸	𝐾𝐸𝑌	𝑂𝐹	𝐴𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸 :  
7251f20362c54aa0a207ff78492c655b2056aa 
 
Generation of Public and Private keys of Bob: 
bob = crypto.Key.make_priv() à Creates a public-private key pair for bob. 
bob_private_key = bob.dump_priv() à to generate a private key for bob( 𝑆𝐾4	). 
bob_public_key = bob.dump_pub()  à  to generate a public key for bob 𝑃𝐾04  
 𝑃𝐾4 ∶ 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶	𝐾𝐸𝑌	𝑂𝐹	𝐵𝑂𝐵:  
40365e7a6c7c49a42202948206965a4242664c354c4c7750602e702027282d74c64242035525940
2020414846472073a204579664967206d1174d92f6f5020236eaa0a0205020202420706d20706d2
13a7d4aaa0a020a02049202e672059 
 𝑆𝐾4: 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇	𝐾𝐸𝑌	𝑂𝐹	𝐵𝑂𝐵 :  
79606151aa0a0a0a0a02067352aa0a0206645203166aa 
 
Re-encryption key Alice to Bob: 
alice_bob_re_encryption_key = alice.re_encryptionKey(bob) àto generate re-encryption key by 
Alice for bob(𝑅𝐾0→4). 𝑅𝐾0→4: 𝑅𝐸 − 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑅𝑌𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁	𝐾𝐸𝑌  
6c5f3a5a2b332677203320a53772142616775624d60784a26319204233c232058e6173203c6b232
06b204484d4c52aa0a020276d6220206226752030765c6356272d20303320492b205b2524206b2
0476420486673415c202d333e3212043413b53 
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Encryption: 
 In the case of encryption, as discussed previously in the AFGH algorithm, a message 
encrypted with a private key under Alice will be re-encrypted for an arbitrary user to decrypt. The 
following two functions will be used for encryption and re-encryption for bob (i) encrypt() (ii) 
alice.re_encryptionKey(bob).reencrypt(). As discussed earlier, the re-encryption process will be 
done by the cloud service provider and it converts the first level encrypted text into a cipher text 
for bob. The re-encryption process is done by the proxy-server. Here, the Proxy cannot read the 
plain text from the first level cipher text forwarded by Alice because it doesn’t know Bob’s private 
key.  
Plain text for testing:  
 Some sample input text! 
Encrypted message by Alice: encrypted_msg = alice.encrypt(test_message) 
20756f69201d82071646265304e7520204f64a0a020a040a344e6532513f2037204f322035402863
2371542164205320334d20293a657820aa020707d785f48442b612f207e53293930fc0620792020
71724730573aa0a0204c41776064485620345b274f20794a3f4576202060772b462c657832387a3
12520206420626c5f2041562e2042a24203058204e520794085a2029635de2b6d704817d725b5d7
254207520601426595f552020543a4e6f68206e735b783731262c23786120786c4226e612033366
44a276d203720254a2071294f73784c372420752b2c2278e7420aa0a020347b517d205675f61724
94720723e2a6356d202865aa0a207151203f32733862384b4c204bc475e37d6820202b25677f420
4d7adb06dc4c36202a3d7b645a20492060506c20203c48315320612231673b26782858294040a  
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Re-encrypted message: 
re-encrypted_msg = alice_bob_re_encryption_key(bob).reencrypt(encrypted_msg) 
4744204fb17374676d55788aa0a0203e203320335a4e2b69696a4a544d6020723220353c6a20207
e7958202020775362a5f385348437e205e54543e552d20303a369d232323b2d206b6a642018204a
72312e7020576b693e6677686f5920404f2664300717d436f784e6d79aa0a20444f5232025743a79
206c2057723a2c4e7239405b51717584caa0a020a02e534b406871aa0a204320527338665d70562
ef6973c27a0a020a025b2f511a205255f786c4b3c55204a7484e52207c70205e294d190643248717
56220794a3f4576202060772b462c657832387a312520206420626c5f2041562e2042a242030582
04e520794085a2029635de2b6d704817d725b5d7254207520601426595f552020543a4e6f68206e
735b783731262c23786120786c4226e61203336644a276d203720254a2071294f73784c37242075
2b2c2278e7420aa0a020347b517d205675f6172494720723e2a6356d2028650207151203f327338
62384b4c204bc475e37d6820202b25677f4204d7adb06dc4c36202a3d7b645a20492060506c2020
3c48315320612231673b26782858294040 
 
Decrypted message: Some sample input text! 
Final_message = bob.decrypt(re-encrypted_msg) 
Note: All the keys and encrypted messages examples given above are Base16 encoded. 
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Protocol verification results:  
 
 
Figure 12. Settings on Scyther tool for the verification of Secure data sharing protocol. 
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Figure 13. Results from the Scyther verification tool  
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK  
Discussion 
The rapid adaptation to mobile devices and data sharing has changed our life style 
significantly. Despite the fact that this provides extraordinary comfort and proficiency, it also 
imposes greater challenges in ensuring a secure transfer of sensitive information through these 
devices. This information could be highly confidential that the owner wants to provide access 
privileges only to authorized individuals. Many cryptographic algorithms together with potent data 
protection mechanisms available today are robust enough to ensure the Confidentiality, Integrity 
and Availability of information. One significant use-case in this regard that this research work tries 
to address is when the data owner only wants to share the data securely with the authorized user, 
making it extremely difficult for the user to store or make a copy of the data or to share it with 
others. 
A detailed literature survey is presented, that discusses the previous research addressing 
the security issues in sharing the data with third party cloud servers to distribute the data to 
authorized end-users. Enhancements in the field of security to protect the data in third party Cloud 
service providers and also to protect data in user’s devices appear to be increasingly significant to 
ensure data privacy and protection in an efficient and feasible way.  
 This thesis is focused to design a sharing system where owners can share the data with 
authorized users through third party cloud service providers. The CSPs will not be able to read the 
underlying plain text and the overhead of storing files has been significantly reduced compared to 
traditional asymmetric systems as only a single file encrypted with owner’s public key along with 
the different re-encryption keys is stored in the CSP for multiple users. Together with the file 
sharing mechanism, a significant and distinct scenario that this thesis work greatly focused on is 
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to ensure security when the data owner only wants to share the data securely with the authorized 
user, and making it extremely difficult for the user to store or make a copy of the data or to share 
it with others. In this scenario, it is practically impossible for the data owner to be available and 
spy on the user all the time to ensure these security requirements are met. Security in the user’s 
device has been achieved with a novel way of leveraging the security features of recipient’s device, 
mobile device (iOS) in this case. This work is possible on a non-jailbroken IOS device which acts 
as a recipient’s device, as it prevents the users and attackers to override the security features of the 
mobile device as described in chapter 4 to attack the application and read the data from memory 
at runtime. 
This work would be very valuable when one wants to share the files through a third party 
cloud service provider and restrict the end users to store or share the data with other unauthorized 
users. This mechanism can be handy in the applications such as snapchat, where the pictures of 
the users are not supposed to be stored in the device. Though there is a possibility of users taking 
the picture of the data with another camera still they cannot be able to obtain the same metadata of 
the original file. 
The security of the proposed protocol in this thesis work has been verified by using Scyther 
automated security protocol verification tool. The experimental evaluation and results show that 
the proposed scheme only contributes to a negligible computational and storage overhead at the 
proxy server and at the data owner and data user, it doesn’t add any significant overhead in terms 
of computation, storage and communication. This proves that the proposed scheme is practical 
without adding overhead to the original proxy re-encryption algorithm and can be effectively used 
to share sensitive data with authorized users while preventing the users from sharing with 
unauthorized users.  
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Future Work 
This work has a wide scope and it opens an avenue for further research in enhancing the 
security at the end-user’s device. In this research, it is assumed that the end-user’s device is a non-
jailbroken IOS device for making sure the security features provided by the IOS operating system 
are intact and not tampered. The security features such as sandbox and ASLR provided by mobile 
operating systems are crucial in making sure that the memory being used by the application is not 
attacked or read by other applications.  There is extreme research being done in hardening the 
mobile devices to prevent the jail breaks, this by itself opens up a different area of research.  
This thesis focused primarily only on the data sharing system and protecting the data at 
end-user’s device but as of now, it doesn’t yet provide the facility to revoke access to the files by 
the end-users. If the end-user, for some reason revokes the current public-private key pair he is 
using, there is no way he can receive the blocks of data because the old re-encryption key would 
now be no longer valid. Again a secure hand-shake mechanism should take place between the data 
owner and the end-user to authenticate the user and verify the new key-pair. Also, CSP is assumed 
to be semi-trusted in this scheme because the number of times a user can access the data is decided 
by the owner and implemented by the CSP. As of now, the data owner doesn’t verify if the CSP is 
providing access more number of times. Also, access to the end-users is provided by the help of 
CSP, so we have to make sure that the CSP will not provide access to the data after the owner 
informs it to revoke access to a particular user. 
 Another possibility of enhancing this research is to include identity based cryptographic 
techniques into this system and then sharing data based on the user access privileges. This can be 
achieved by adding a unique personal information related to user such as location or IPaddress to 
generate a public key. 
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